Stop Fighting Starlink Restrictions — Start Supporting Digital Sovereignty

The humanitarian sector is increasingly finding itself on the wrong side of the debate over satellite internet—particularly when it comes to Starlink. Across Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, we lament restrictions on Starlink as if every regulatory measure were an assault on connectivity itself. But this reaction misses a deeper and more uncomfortable truth.

Governments are not rejecting connectivity. They are asserting digital sovereignty over infrastructure that currently operates beyond their regulatory reach.

It is time to abandon the Silicon Valley myth that connectivity is a “neutral good” that should flow freely across borders without governance. The evidence now tells a different story. From Uganda to Papua New Guinea to Vietnam, states are asserting authority over low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite systems because these systems challenge the very foundations of national regulation, security, and fiscal capacity.

Rather than positioning humanitarian actors in opposition to these measures, we should be working with governments to recognize connectivity as critical national digital infrastructure—not an exception to sovereignty.

The Logic of National Sovereignty

Take Uganda’s recent restrictions. A Uganda Revenue Authority memo now requires military clearance for all Starlink equipment imports. Opposition leader Bobi Wine predictably framed this as election interference. Yet focusing solely on electoral timing obscures a more fundamental issue that humanitarian organizations must confront.

Uganda’s actions reflect a pattern seen across multiple jurisdictions: so-called “Starlink bans” are better understood as assertions of telecom sovereignty. Governments are using existing regulatory instruments to bring LEO satellite providers back inside national legal, fiscal, and security frameworks.

The key concern is not spectrum scarcity. It is governability. Starlink’s ability to deliver high-capacity connectivity without reliance on national last-mile infrastructure weakens the state’s capacity to license providers, collect taxes, enforce lawful interception, and apply content regulation.

This is not technophobia. It is a rational governance response to infrastructure that currently operates outside traditional accountability systems.

The Humanitarian Sector’s Blind Spot

By reflexively opposing these measures, the humanitarian sector places itself in direct contradiction with the principles of local ownership and sustainability it claims to champion.

We cannot advocate for nationally led development while resisting governments’ efforts to govern their own digital infrastructure.

When humanitarian actors deploy Starlink without authorization, we implicitly argue that connectivity is so important that national sovereignty can be ignored. This is not neutrality. It is digital colonialism with good intentions—the same paternalistic logic that assumes external actors know better than sovereign states how infrastructure should function.

Governments understand exactly what is at stake. Vietnam’s regulatory framework explicitly defines satellite connectivity as infrastructure that must be “domesticated.” This means local entities, domestic gateways, national data routing, and security oversight—not to suppress the internet, but to retain strategic control over a capability that affects political stability, economic resilience, and national security.

The Extractive Economics of Satellite Internet

There is also an economic reality the humanitarian sector often avoids.

In many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), telecommunications represent one of the few scalable sources of formal revenue and regulatory leverage. Unrestricted satellite internet threatens these revenue streams by bypassing licensing fees, universal service contributions, and taxation mechanisms tied to national operators.

Protecting these fiscal flows is not protectionism; it is state capacity building.

Consider Kenya’s intervention around Safaricom Safaricom—where telecom regulation intersects directly with public revenue and national development priorities. Allowing foreign satellite providers to operate outside these systems weakens already fragile governance structures.

Authorized satellite deployments—through licensed resellers, local partnerships, and national gateways—preserve both connectivity and public revenue. Treating regulation of LEO providers as inherently anti-innovation misunderstands how digital infrastructure underpins state viability.

Toward Sovereignty-Aligned Connectivity

Smart humanitarian organizations should stop fighting this trend and start adapting to it.

The solution is not to oppose sovereignty frameworks, but to operate within them, promoting connectivity as properly governed digital public infrastructure.

Good practice in restricted environments includes:

• Legal clarity: Secure written authorization through licensed resellers, NGO import permits, or terminal approvals. Assume unauthorized use is illegal unless explicitly permitted.

• Government engagement: Brief host governments early on how satellite redundancy supports humanitarian objectives—medical referrals, logistics coordination, duty of care—framing deployments as capacity-enhancing, not evasive.

• Infrastructure localization: Prepare for gateway, routing, and localization requirements, as seen in Vietnam. Align internal risk frameworks with lawful surveillance and compliance obligations.

• Operational redundancy: Avoid single-point dependency on any connectivity provider. Plan for service suspension, equipment seizure, or forced handover during political or security crises.

Connectivity as Governed Infrastructure

The digital public infrastructure movement increasingly recognizes that connectivity is not just a service—it is foundational infrastructure tied to sovereignty and national security.

Humanitarian actors should be helping governments build regulatory frameworks that balance openness with control, rather than forcing false choices between connectivity and sovereignty. This means supporting regulatory capacity, transparent licensing regimes, and oversight mechanisms that protect both public interest and operational continuity.

When we work with sovereignty frameworks instead of against them, we reinforce the very local ownership principles that effective development depends on. Treating satellite internet as a workaround to government authority may deliver short-term access—but it ultimately undermines both sustainable connectivity and the state capacity that long-term development requires.

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